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Abstract We use the notion of a promise to define local trust between agents possessing
autonomous decision-making. An agent is trustworthy if it is expected that it will keep a
promise. This definition satisfies most commonplace meanings of trust. Reputation is then
an estimation of this expectation value that is passed on from agent to agent.
Our definition distinguishes types of trust, for different behaviours, and decouples the
concept of agent reliability from the behaviour on which the judgement is based. We show,
however, that trust is fundamentally heuristic, as it provides insufficient information for
agents to make a rational judgement. A global trustworthiness, or community trust can
be defined by a proportional, self-consistent voting process, as a weighted eigenvector-
centrality function of the promise theoretical graph.
1 Introduction
I don’t trust him. We’re friends.
–Bertolt Brecht
The decision to trust someone is a policy decision. Although the decision can be made
ad hoc, our common understanding of trust is that it is based on a gathering of experience,
i.e. a process of learning about the behaviour and reputation of someone in a variety of
scenarios. Our particular policy might weight certain sources and behaviours more heavily
than others and no one can tell us what is the right thing to do. Hence trust is intimately
connected with personal autonomy.
In this paper, we define trust in the spirit of this personal autonomy, by basing it directly
on the concept of how reliably a promise is kept. A promise is also an autonomously made
declaration of behaviour, that is highly individual, moreover it carries with it the notion of a
theme (what the promise is about)[1]. By combining promises with reliability, we thus have
a natural definition of trust that satisfies well-understood rules for revising both the logical
aspects of policy and the statistical observations made about agents’ behaviours. We show
that this viewpoint satisfies the desirable properties for use in computer security schemes.
Note that our aim in this work is not to design a technology for building trust, but rather to
analyse the precepts for what trust actually means to users.
The plan for this paper is as follows (see fig. 1), We discuss the notion of trust from
a pragmatic and philosophical point of view in order to settle on what properties trust
should have. We show that common expressions of trust are often ambiguous, but that we
can resolve this ambiguity by defining agent trust as the expectation of keeping a given
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promise. Using the graphical notions of promises, we can then establish a notion of global
trust in certain cases.
1.1 Trust
The concept of trust is both well known and widely used in all kinds of human interactions.
Trust is something that humans hold both for one another or sometimes for inanimate ob-
jects (“I trust my computer to give the right answer”). In computer systems, the concept of
trust is especially used in connection with security. In risk analysis one considers a secure
system to be one in which every possible risk has either been eliminated or accepted as a
matter of policy. Trust is therefore linked to the concept of policy in a fundamental way.
Trust is also discussed in the case of network security protocols, for instance, in the case
where keys are exchanged. The classic dilemma of key distribution is that there is often a
high level of uncertainty in knowing the true originator of a secure identifier (cryptographic
key). One therefore hopes for the best and, beyond a certain threshold of evidence “trusts”
the assumption of ownership. Several protocols claim to manage such trust issues, but what
does this really mean?
In spite of the reverence in which the concept is held, there is no widely accepted tech-
nical definition of trust. This has long be a hindrance to the discussion and understanding of
the concept. The Wikepedia defines: “Trust is the belief in the good character of one party,
they are believed to seek to fulfil policies, ethical codes, law and their previous promises.”
In this paper, we would like to address the deficiencies of discussions of trust by introduc-
ing a meta-model for understanding trust. Our model can be used to explain and describe
common trust models like “trusted third parties” and the “web of trust”.
1.2 Promises – autonomous claims
Trust is an evaluation that can only be made by an individual. No one can force someone to
trust someone else in a given situation. This basic fact tells us something important about
how trust should be defined.
Recently, one of us has introduced a description of autonomous behaviour in which
individual agents are entirely responsible for their own decisions[2,3,4,5]. Promise theory
is a graphical model of policy. The basic responsibility of an agent to be true to its own
assertions is an important step towards a way of describing trust.
Promise theory is useful in this regard because all agents are automatically responsible
for their own behaviour and only their own behaviour. Responsibility is not automatically
transitive between autonomous agents: it has to be arranged through explicit agreement be-
tween agents in a controlled way; hence one avoids problems such as hidden responsibility
that make the question of whether to trust an individual agent complex.
In this paper, we argue that the concept of trust can be defined straightforwardly as a
valuation of a promise – specifically the expectation of autonomous behaviour. When we
say that we trust something, we are directing this towards the instigator of some promise,
whether implicit or explicit. Moreover reputation is simply what happens to trust as it is
communicated about a network, i.e. it is a ‘rumour’ that spreads epidemically throughout
a network along different paths, and hence develops into a path-dependent estimate of
trustworthiness.
The matter of evidence-gathering, in order to justify the expectation value of keeping
a promise is subtle, and so we shall discuss this in some detail. We argue that there is in-
sufficient information in the notions of trust or reputation to make a reliable estimate of
trustworthiness. Thus trust is an inherently ambiguous concept; each valuation of trustwor-
thiness is, in essence, an essentially ad hoc policy.
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Fig. 1 The chain of trust from verifiable promises to local trust by an agent, to global or community
trust which we interpret as reputation.
2 Prior work
There is an extensive literature on trust in computer science[6,7,8,9,10,11]. Much of it is
concerned with generating protocols for the purpose of determining the validity of public
keys and other identity tokens, or criticizing these mechanistic views in a wider security
perspective. Here we are mainly concerned with general ideas about trust and reputation.
We find the recent work of Klu¨wer and Waaler to be of interest from the viewpoint of
logic[12,13]. These authors present a natural reasoning system about trust which includes
the notion of ordering by levels of trustworthiness.
The work that seems closest to ours may be found in ref. [14] and ref. [15]. Here the
authors distinguish between trust and reputation and provide an epidemic-like procedure
for valuating the trust based on some inference rules and numerical measures that are es-
sentially reliabilities. The calculation is hence mainly appropriate for a frequentist interpre-
tation of probability. The authors in ref. [14] are unable to distinguish trust about different
issues, or relate these in their model. In ref. [15], an attempt is made at motivating trust
types but the underlying properties of these types is not completely clear.
In our proposal:
1. We allow for multiple sources (types) for which trust and reputation are valuated.
2. Our combinatorics are based on logic and on Bayesian probability estimates, which are
more appropriate estimators for the small amounts of experience involved.
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Other work which we find valuable includes social viewpoints of trust (see ref. [16] for
a review). This work brings in the matter of human value judgements, which we feel is an
important issue in any definition of trust, since it is humans who make the final decisions
in practice. From a sociological viewpoint, there are many forms of currency on which to
build trust. Some of these are based on the outcomes of stand-offs such as economic games,
bargaining situations and so on[17]. Promises have already been shown to incorporate these
considerations neatly within their framework[4].
3 Common usage of trust and reputation
As with most words, the English word ‘trust’ has a number of related meanings which are
worth documenting for reference and comparison.
– Trust implies a confidence or faith character: e.g. one “trusts in friends and family”.
– It might be based on an assessment of reliability: e.g. “A trustworthy employee”
– A related, but not identical meaning has to do with presumed safety. It also means to
permit something without fear. “I trust the user to access the system without stealing.”
Such trust can be betrayed.
This is different because the feeling of safety is not a rationally determined quantity,
whereas reliability is observable and measurable. Thus there is both a rational and an
irrational aspect to trust.
– A final meaning of trust is the expression of hope, i.e. and expectation or wish: ”I trust
you will behave better from now on”;
Trust is therefore about the suspension of disbelief. It involves a feeling of benevolence,
or competence on the part of the trustee.
Trust of this kind expresses an acceptance of risk, e.g. a jewelry store trusts that passers-
by will not smash a plate glass window very often to steal displayed goods, but rather
trusts that the windows will improve sales. There could therefore be an economic deci-
sion involved in risk-taking.
Reputation is a related notion to trust. We understand this to mean a received judge-
ment, i.e. an evaluation of an agent’s reliability based on hearsay. Reputation spreads like
an epidemic process, but it is potentially modified on each transmission. Thus, from a
given source, several reputations might emerge by following different pathways (histories)
through a network.
4 A typed definition of trust
An agent that is known to keep its promises is considered trustworthy by any normal defi-
nition of trust i.e. the agent would be reliable and predictable such that one could put aside
one’s doubts about whether it might fail to live up to its assertions.
It seems natural then to associate trust with one agent’s expectation of the performance
of another agent in implementing its promises. This could seem like an unnecessarily nar-
row definition, but it turns out to be more general than one might expect. What about trust in
matters that have not yet occurred? Clearly, trust could be formulated about a future poten-
tial promise. i.e. a promise does not have been made for us to evaluate its likely reliability.
The usefulness of promises is that they encapsulate the relevant information to categorise
intentions and actions.
Proposal 1 (Trust) Trust can be defined as an agent’s expectation that a promise will be
kept. It is thus a probability lying between 0 and 1.
We shall define “an agent’s expectation” in detail below, and we shall additionally give
meaning to the concepts of when an agent is deemed to be trustworthy or trusting which
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are global concepts, different from merely trusted. This proposal has a number of posi-
tive qualities. To begin with it separates the experiential aspect of trust from the nature
of the actions on which it is based. Thus in terms of philosophy of science, it makes a
clean distinction between empirical knowledge (expectation) and theoretical knowledge (a
promise).
Our definition is specific. The concept of trust, as normally applied in computer science
is rather universal and non-specific: either one trusts another agent or one does not; how-
ever, it is seldom that we trust or distrust anyone or anything so completely. Our definition
is a typed definition, i.e. we gauge trust separately for each individual kind of promise –
and this is where promises provide a convenient notation and conceptual stepping stone.
We assume that promises are a more fundamental notion than trust.
According to our definition, trust is a reliability rating made by some agent that is able
to observe two agents involved in a promise. We hesitate to call this a reliability measure:
for reasons that we shall make clear, there is normally insufficient evidence on which to
base a proper reliability estimate, in the sense of reliability theory[18].
A reputation is little more than a rumour that spreads epidemically throughout a net-
work. Common ideas about reputation include.
– “A general opinion of someone.”
– “A measure of someone’s standing in the community.”
Reputation is not necessarily related to trustworthiness. One could have a reputation based
on how much money an agent spends, or how much fuel it uses. What characterizes a
reputation, as opposed to a personal observation or evaluation, is that it is passed on. One
does not observe the characteristic first hand.
Proposal 2 (Reputation) Reputation can be defined as a valuation of some agent’s past
or expected behaviour that is communicated to another agent.
We clarify and develop these basic proposals in the remainder of the paper. In particular
trust will be revisited in more detail in section 8.
4.1 Promises
To base our notion of trust on promises, we review the basic concepts from promise theory.
Promises are closely linked to the idea of policy, or declarations of autonomous decision-
making. Indeed, we define policy to be simply a set of promises, since one can always
phrase decisions about how to respond to future events and scenarios as promises about
what one will do.
Consider a general set of N agents Ai, where i = 1, . . . , N . We denote agents by
capital Roman letters, and shall often use nicknames S for promise-sender or giver, R for
promise receiver and T for third parties, to assist the discussion.
Definition 1 (Promise) A promise is an autonomous specification of unobserved or in-
tended behaviour. It involves a promiser and one or more promisees to whom the promise
is directed. The scope of the promise is the set of agents who have knowledge of the promise
that has been made. Each promise contains a promise body b that describes the content of
the promise. We denote a promise from agent S to an agent R, with body b by:
S
pi:b
−→ R (1)
The body b of every promise contains a type t(b) and often an additional constraint. Promise
types distinguish the qualitative differences between promises, and additional constraint
attributes distinguish the quantitative differences. For each promise body b, there is another
promise body ¬b which represents the negation of b. We shall assume that t(¬b) = t(b)
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and that ¬¬b = b. The negation of b refers to the deliberate act of not performing b, or what
ever is the complementary action of type t(b).
Promises fall into two basic complementary kinds, which we can think of as promises
for giving and taking, or service and usage. A promised exchange of some service s requires
one of each kind:
A1
pi:s
−→ A2 or A1
pi:+s
−→ A2
A2
pi:U(s)
−→ A1 or A2
pi:−s
−→ A1 (2)
Exclusive promises are those which cannot physically be realized at the same time. This
does not mean that incompatible promises cannot be made, it means that they are meaning-
less and could lead to problems for the agent.
Definition 2 (Incompatible promises #) When two promises originating from an agent
are incompatible, they cannot be realized physically at the same time. We write
A1
pi:b1−→ A2 # A1
pi:b2−→ A3 (3)
If A2 = A3, we may omit the agents and write b1#b2.
It would probably be unwise for an agent to trust another agent that made simultaneous,
incompatible promises. Of course this is a policy decision for each individual agent to
make.
Breaking a promise is not the same as not keeping a promise. It is an explicit contra-
diction. Again, confidence in an agent’s promise-keeping ability is reduced when it makes
contradictory promises.
Definition 3 (Promise conflict) Two or more promises to an agent are in conflict if at least
one promise is contradicted by another. We define a conflict as the promising of exclusive
promises
A1
pi:b1−→ A2, A1
pi:b2−→ A2 with b1#b2 (4)
Clearly promising b and ¬b would be excluded.
4.2 Composition of parallel promises
We can compose trivial bundles of promises between a single pair of agents by union. Using
proof notation:
a
pi:b1−→ b, a
pi:b2−→ b, . . . a
pi:bN−→ b,
a
pi:b1∪b2∪...bN−→ b
(5)
where the non-overlap of independent type regions is not necessarily assumed, but helps to
make sense of this (the definition should still work even if the types overlap). The compo-
sition of promises in a serial fashion is non-trivial and only has meaning in a minority of
cases, where autonomy is relinquished.
A promise made conditionally on a Boolean conditionC, known to the promising agent
is written:
Definition 4 (Conditional promise) A conditional promise is written:
A1
pi:b|C
−→ A2 (6)
i.e. A1 promises b to A2 if the condition C is true.
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Note that a condition can also be the subject of a promise. We write
A1
pi:T(C)
−→ A2 (7)
for the promise from A1 to A2 to ensure that the condition C holds. Now the combination
of a conditional promise and the promise of the condition holding leads to an unconditional
promise as follows:
A1
pi:b|C
−→ A2, A1
pi:T(C)
−→ A2
A1
pi:b
−→ A2
(8)
A promise is not truly a promise unless the truth of the condition is also promised.
4.3 General notation for promises
The following notation for promises has been designed to be clear and pragmatic, avoiding
potential recursion difficulties of promises about promises. We begin with the kind of basic
promise from one agent to another and then generalize this:
1. The preferred form of a promise (first kind) is written.
S
pi:b
−→ R (9)
This is a local and autonomously made promise. This is equivalent to the more general
notation:
S[S]
pi:b
−→ R[R]. (10)
i.e. S promises b to R.
2. A promise of the second kind allows obligation:
S[T ]
pi:b
−→ R (11)
i.e. S promises R that it will oblige T to act as if it had promised b to R. If T is
autonomous, this is forbidden and has no influence on T .
3. A promise of the third kind allows indirection.
S
pi:b
−→ R[T ] (12)
i.e. S promises to R that S will do b for T .
4. The most general form of a promise:
S[T ]
pi:b
−→ D[U ] (13)
i.e. S promises D that b will act as if it had promised b to U . If T is autonomous, this
is forbidden and has no influence of T .
We have potentially a need for all of these variants.
Example 1 Promises about policy in which one does not inform the promise recipient (e.g.
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) policy) may be written:
S
pi:b
−→ S[R] (14)
i.e. S makes a promise only to itself to honour b toward R (e.g. suppose b is a promise to
use packet-data received). This is the case, for instance, in the processing of Access Control
Lists by most network devices: the sender of data has no a priori idea of whether the device
will accept it.
Most of the promises we shall consider in the definition of trust will be of the form
A2
pi:b
−→ A1[A3] (15)
i.e. a neighbouring agent promises us that it will do something for some third party (where
the third party might also be us).
8 Jan Bergstra, Mark Burgess
4.4 A general expression for trust
Trust is somehow complementary to the idea of a service promise. This is suggested by
the intuition that a promise to use a service implies a measure of trust on the part of the
receiver. We consider trust a directed relationship from a truster to a trustee. Moreover, it
is a judgement or valuation of a promise performed entirely by the truster.
We need a notation to represent this, similar to that for promises. In the spirit of the
promise notation, we write the general case as:
S[T ]
τ :b
−→ R[U ] (16)
meaning that S trusts R to ensure that T keeps a promise of b to U .
In most cases, this is too much generality. In a world of autonomous agents, no agent
would expect agent S to be able to ensure anything about agent T ’s behaviour. The more
common case is therefore with only three parties
A1[A2]
τ :b
−→ A2[A3] (17)
i.e. agentA1 trusts agentA2 to keep its promise towards some third-party agentA3. Indeed,
in most cases A3 might also be identified with A1:
A1[A2]
τ :b
−→ A2[A1] (18)
which, in turn, can be simplified to
A1
τ :b
−→ A2. (19)
In this case, trust is seen to be a dual concept to that of a promise. If we use the notation
of ref. [4], then we can write trust as one possible valuation v : pi → [0, 1] by A1 of the
promise made by A2 to it:
A1[A2]
τ :b
−→ A2[A1] ↔ v1(A2
pi:b
−→ A1) (20)
This is then a valuation on a par with economic valuations of how much a promise is worth
to an agent[4]. The recipient of a promise can only make such a valuation if it knows that
the promise has been made.
Proposal 3 Trust of an agent S by another agent R can exist if agent R is informed that
agent S has made a promise to it in the past, or if the recipient of the promise R is able to
infer by indirect means that S has made such a promise.
Thus any agent can formulate a trust policy towards any other agent. The only remaining
question is, on what basis should such a judgement be made?
Our contention is that the most natural valuation to attach to trust is an agent’s estimate
of the expectation value that the promise will be kept, i.e. an estimate of the reliability of
the agent’s promise.
A1[A2]
τ :b
−→ A2[A1]
P
≡ E1(A2
pi:b
−→ A1) (21)
where P≡ means ‘is defined by policy as’, and the expectation value ER(·), for agent R
has yet to be defined (see Appendix A for these details). We note the essential difficulty:
that such valuations of reliability are not unique. They are, in fact, entirely subjective and
cannot be evaluated without ad hoc choices of a number of free parameters. We return to
this point below.
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5 Cases: The underlying promises for trust idioms
To ensure that our definition of trust is both intuitive and general, we present a number of
‘use-cases’ below and use these to reveal, in each case, the expectation of a promise that
underlies the trust. In each case, we write the declarations of trust, in notation, in words, and
as an expectation value of an underlying promise. In some cases, the expressions of trust
are ambiguous and support several interpretations which can only be resolved by going to
a deeper explanation in terms of promises.
– I trust my computer to give the right answer. This could literally mean that one trusts
the computer, as a potentially unreliable piece of hardware:
Me
τ :answer
−→ Computer
P
≡ EMe(Computer
pi:answer
−→ Me) (22)
i.e. I expect that the computer will keep its (implicit) promise to furnish me with the
correct answer.
However, there is another interpretation. We might actually (even subconsciously) mean
that we trust the company that produces the software (the vendor) to make the computer
deliver the right answer when asked, i.e. I expect the promise by the vendor to me, to
make the computer give me the right answer, will be kept.
[Me][Computer]
τ :answer
−→ [Vendor][Me]
P
≡ EMe
(
[Vendor][Computer]
pi:Answer
−→ [Me][Me]
)
(23)
In either case, the relationship between the promise, the expectation and the trust is the
same.
– I trust the identity of a person (e.g. by presence, public key or signature).
This is one of the classic problems of security systems, and we find that the simple
statement hides a muddle of possibilities. It has many possible interpretations; however,
in each case we obtain clarity by expressing these in terms of promises.
Me
τ :Authentic
−→ Signature
P
≡ EMe(Signature
pi:Authentic
−→ Me) (24)
In this version, we place trust in the implicit promise that a credential makes of being
an authentic mark of identity. This is a simple statement, but we can be sceptical of the
ability of a signature to make any kind of promise.
Me[Signature]
τ :Authentic
−→ Certifier[Me]
P
≡ EMe(Certifier[Signature]
pi:Authentic
−→ Me) (25)
i.e. I trust a Certifying Agency to ensure that the implicit promise made by the credential
to represent someone is kept. Or I expect the certifying agency (possibly the originator
of the signature himself) to keep a promise to me to ensure that the signature’s promise
to me is kept (e.g. the technology is tamper-proof).
Yet a third interpretation is that the trust of the key is based on the promise to verify its
authenticity, on demand. This is the common understanding of the “trusted third party”.
Me
τ :verify key
−→ Certifier
P
≡ EMe
(
Certifier
pi:verify key
−→ Me
)
(26)
i.e. I trust that the key has been authorized and is verifiable by the named Certifica-
tion Agency. This last case avoids the problem of why one should trust the Certifying
Agency, since it refers only to the verification service itself.
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– A similar problem is encountered with currency denominations, e.g. pound notes, dol-
lars, or Euros. These tokens are clearly not valuable in and of themselves; rather they
represent value. Indeed, on British Pound notes, the words “I promise to pay the bearer
on demand the sum of ... X pounds” is still found, with the printed signature of the
Chief Cashier. Indeed, the treasury will, if pressed, redeem the value of these paper
notes in gold. Thus trust in a ten pound note may be expressed in a number of ways.
We trust the note to be legal tender: i.e.
Me
τ :legal
−→ Note
P
≡ EMe
(
Cashier
pi:gold|note
−→ Me
)
(27)
we expect that the chief cashier will remunerate us in gold on presenting the note.
Alternatively, we assume that others will promise to accept the note as money in the
United Kingdom (UK):
Me
τ :legal
−→ Note
P
≡ EMe
(
S
pi:U(note)
−→ Me
)
, S ∈ UK (28)
Interestingly neither dollars nor Euros make any much promise. Rather, the dollar bill
merely claims “In God we trust”.
– Trust in family and friends.
This case is interesting, since it is so unspecific that it could be assigned almost any
meaning. Indeed, each agent is free to define its meaning autonomously. For some set
of one or more promises P∗,
Me
τ :P∗
−→ {Family}
P
≡ EMe
(⋃
i∈∗
{Family}
pi:Pi−→ Ai
)
(29)
i.e. for some arbitrary set of promises, we form an expectation about the likelihood that
family and friends would keep their respective promises to the respective promisees.
These promises might, in fact, be hypothetical and the evaluations mere beliefs. On
the other hand, we might possess actual knowledge of these transactions, and base
judgement on the word of one of these family/friend members to keep their promises
to the third parties:
Me
τ :P∗
−→ {Family}
P
≡ EMe
(⋃
i∈∗
{Family}
pi:Pi−→ Me[Ai]
)
(30)
– A trustworthy employee.
In this case, one bases trustworthiness is based more on a history of delivering on
promises made in the context of work, e.g.:
Boss
τ :Deliver
−→ Employee
P
≡ EBoss(Employee
pi:Deliver
−→ Boss) (31)
– I trust the user to access the system without stealing.
Here the promise is not to steal. The promise does not have to have been made explicitly.
Indeed, in civil society this is codified into law, and hence all agents implicitly promise
this by participating in that society.
– “I trust you will behave better from now on!”
This can be understood in two ways. In the first interpretation, this is not so much
an evaluation of trust as it is a challenge (or even warning) to the agent to do better.
Alternatively, it can be taken literally as an expression of belief that the agent really
will do better. In the latter case, it is:
Me
τ :Do better
−→ You
P
≡ EMe
(
You
pi:Do better
−→ Me
)
(32)
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6 Expectations of ensembles and compositions of promises
We are not done with policy’s intrusion into the definition of expectation. Since promises
can be composed according to straightforward rules, we must be able to compute two dis-
tinct things:
1. The expectation of a composition of promises that coexist.
2. The composition of expectations from different ensembles.
The difference between these is analogous to the difference between the combinations of
experimental data into ensembles for computing probabilities, and the composition of dif-
ferent probable inputs in fault trees (with AND, OR, XOR, etc).
We have already discussed the composition of data sets into ensembles, the effect this
has on probabilities, and how this is expressed in terms of the basic expectation values in
section A.1
We shall have need to define the meaning of the following in order to determine the
trust deriving from compound promises:
1. The expectation of incompatible promises.
2. The expectation of a composition of parallel promises between a pair of agents.
3. The expectation of a composition of serial promises between a chain of agents.
6.1 Parallel promise (bundle) expectation
When promises are made in parallel, the question arises as to how much to trust them as
a bundle. Should one ever base one’s trust on a complete package or bundle of promises?
This is a subjective judgement based on whether certain promises are related in the view of
the promisee. If one makes an expectation valuation for each promise individually, does it
make sense to combine them as probabilities, e.g. in the manner of a fault tree[19,18]. One
is used to the probability composition rules for binary logic of independent events.
– (AND): If the promisee is dependent on several mutually reinforcing promises, then
AND semantics are a reasonable assumption. In a security situation, this might be
reasonable. The multiplicative combination rule means that each additional promise
that must be in place reduces the total trust that the promiser will keep all of its promises
proportionally.
– (OR) Here one says that if one or more promises are kept, then trustworthiness is
reinforced. This is an optimistic policy which seems to suggest that the promisee is
understanding about the promiser’s potential difficulties in keeping a promise. This
cannot be applied to incompatible promises.
– (XOR): An alternative scenario is to have a number of promises that are alternatives
for one another. For instance, mutually exclusive conditional promises that behave like
a switch: e.g.
S
pi:x|y
−→ R
S
pi:x′|¬y
−→ R, (33)
i.e. S promises x to R, iff y, else it promises x′.
– (RANKED) If the promises are ranked in their importance to the recipient, then the
measure of trust associated with the package is best judged by weighting the importance
appropriately. Referring to the discussion in section A.1, this admits a general convex
combination of contributions for ranking an OR (see below).
Let us consider how these are represented as functions.
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Definition 5 (Expectation of a promise bundle) Let S (sender) andR (recipient) be agents
that make a number of promises in parallel, the composition of a bundle of parallel promises
S
pi:b∗
−→ R is a function FR of the expectations of the individual promises:
ER
(
S
pi:b∗
−→ R
)
P
≡ FR
(
ER
(
S
pi:b1−→ R
)
, ER
(
S
pi:b2−→ R
)
, . . .
)
(34)
The functionFR is a mapping fromN promise expectations to a new expectation value:
FR : [0, 1]
N → [0, 1] (35)
Several such functions are known from reliability theory, e.g. in fault tree analysis (see for
instance ref. [18]). Examples include,
FANDR
(
S
pi:b∗
−→ R
)
=
∏
i
ER
(
S
pi:bi−→ R
)
(36)
FORR
(
S
pi:b∗
−→ R
)
= 1−
∏
i
(
1− ER
(
S
pi:bi−→ R
))
≃
∑
i
ER
(
S
pi:bi−→ R
)
± O(E2) (37)
FXORR
(
S
pi:b∗
−→ R
)
≃ 1−
∏
i
(
1− ER
(
S
pi:bi−→ R
))
≃
∑
i
ER
(
S
pi:bi−→ R
)
± O(E2). (38)
where O(E2) denotes terms or the order of the probability squared, which are small. A
further possibility is to take a weighted mean of the promise estimates. This better supports
the view in section A.1 about different sizes ensembles and their relative weights. There
might be additional (irrational) reasons for giving priority to certain promises, e.g. leniency
with respect to a difficult promise.
To combine the different possibilities (analogously to fault trees) one could first re-
duce products of AND promises into sub-bundles, then recombine these using a weighted
estimate.
FRANKEDR
P
≡
∑
i
αiER
(
S
pi:bi−→ R
)
∑
i
αi = 1 (39)
Note that, due to the reasoning of probability theory, the expectation of something AND
something else is less than the probability of either. This might be seen as pessimistic as
far as trust is concerned. We have to make a policy decision about whether or not to place
any weight on the combined expectation of a bundle of promises, or whether to decide to
only allow individual expectations.
For example, suppose an agent makes two contradictory promises about services levels,
e.g. promise to respond in 4ms and promise to respond in 5ms.
S
pi:4
−→ R
S
pi:5
−→ R (40)
Formally, this is a conflict, since both promises cannot be true at the same time. The trust
in each individual promise can be estimated independently for the two promises. The agent
reliability expectations of delivering “4” or “5” units of service are:
R
τ :4
−→ S = ER(4) = p(4) = 0.1 (41)
R
τ :5
−→ S = ER(5) = p(5) = 0.2 (42)
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Then we can consider what the expectation of the combination of promises is. If the agent
S makes both promises simultaneously, the expectation of the combined promises will be:
ER(4 XOR 5) ≃
(e4ER(4) + e5ER(5))
(e4 + e5)
(43)
where e4 is our estimate of likelihood the agent can deliver “4” and e5 is the estimate
of likelihood of delivering “5”. These beliefs can be based on many potential sources of
information, chosen as a matter of policy; one possibility is to simply identify e4
P
≡ ER(4)
and e5
P
≡ ER(5). Thus a simple policy solution could be to take
ER(4 OR 5)
P
≡
ER(4)
2 + ER(5)
5
ER(4) + ER(5)
= 0.17 (44)
i.e. in general a sum of squares.
6.2 Incompatible promise expectation
For incompatible promises we must have at least complementary behaviour (NOT):
EA(S
pi:¬b
−→ R) = 1− EA(S
pi:b
−→ R)
FR(ER(S
pi:¬b
−→ R)) = 1− FR(ER(S
pi:b
−→ R)) (45)
Ideally incompatible promises would not be made, without conditionals to select only one
of the alternatives.
In the case of AND it is necessary already to resolve the ambiguity in the meaning
of the combination of incompatible promises. It is by definition a logical impossibility for
incompatible promises to be kept. Thus, while we cannot prevent an agent from promising
such nonsense, our expectation of the combination ought to be zero.
Definition 6 (Expectation of incompatible promises with AND) The expectation of in-
compatible promises,
FR
(
A1
pi:b1−→ A2 AND A1
pi:b2−→ A2
)
≡ 0 when b1#b2 (46)
is defined to be zero for any rational agent.
Hence, in the example above,
ER(4 AND 5) = 0. (47)
6.3 Serial promise expectation and transitivity of trust
Several systems base their operation on the idea that trust is to some extent transitive. “The
Web of Trust” notion in public key management idea proposes that trust can be conferred
transitively. This is not a property of promises, so it is of interest to consider how this
works. In other words, if A1 trusts A2 to do b, and A2 trusts A3 to do b, then A1 will often
trust A3 to do b. Here b is generally taken to be “reveal one’s true identity”. This notion
does not fit well with a promise theory interpretation of trust because it is type-unspecific.
This is easy to see by noting that
A1
pi:b
−→ A2, A2
pi:b
−→ A3 6⇒ A1
pi:b
−→ A3 (48)
i.e. if A1 makes a promise of b to A2 and A2 makes the same promise to A3, it does not
follow that A1 has made any promise to A3.
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An unspecific trust model might conform to the following property:
(i) (A1 Trusts A2), (A2 Trusts A3)⇒ A1 Trusts A3 (49)
In terms of promises, we would interpret this to mean that, ifA1 trustsA2 (to keep promises
to A1) and A2 trusts A3 (to keep promises to A2) then A1 should trust A3 to keep promises
to A1. This is far from being a rational policy, since there is no evidence passed on about
the reliability of agents. A less problematic alternative is:
(ii) (A1
τ :inform
−→ A2), (A2
τ :b
−→ A3)⇒ A1[A3]
τ :b
−→ A3[A2] (50)
If A1 trusts A2 (to inform it about its relations with A3) and A2 trusts A3 (to keep its
promise of b to A2), then A1 trusts that A3 is trustworthy in its promise of b to A2.
The matter of serial promises is one of diverging complication. We make some brief
notes about the problems associated with serial promises, and leave the potentially exten-
sive details for elsewhere. The problems with trusting a distributed collection of promises
are
1. Promises are not common knowledge, so we do not have all the information.
2. Promises are not transitive.
Knowledge about the promises and the local evaluations by the agents can only be
guaranteed by making chains of promises between the agents to share this knowledge.
A1
pi:tell rep
−→ A2
pi:tell rep
−→ A3
A1
pi:U(tell rep)
←− A2
pi:U(tell rep)
←− A3 (51)
In order to pass on the necessary information about trust to a third party, it must be re-
layed. Expectation of a chain of promises depends on a chain of such trust and Use(trust)
promises. However, each agent in the chain agrees only to trust the previous agent. There
is no automatic agreement to trust the previous members. If one were to make an explicit
promise to trust each agent’s information about trust, this would require a promise graph
like the one in fig. 2. In order to remove the ambiguity of the trust promises, we must use a
A B C D
Fig. 2 A chain of trust promises to transfer some valuation of trust in one direction (only), from node
a to each agent up to node d. This method is unreliable because nodes b and c are under no obligation
to pass on the correct value. Note that these are promise arrows, not trust arrows.
This is clearly a fragile and somewhat complicated structure. An alternative approach is to avoid
chains of greater length than one, and also eliminate the extraneous and essentially impotent promises
from the chain, as in fig. 3. However, this leads us merely back to the notion of a centralization, either
in the form of a trusted party for all agents, or as a complete peer-to-peer graph.
different promise type for trust about each agent in the graph. i.e. the trust passed on from
agent a must retain this label in being transferred. However, here one has a paradox: if
an agent is potentially unreliable, then it can easily lie about this information. Such serial
chains are, in general fraught with uncertainty, thus agents might well choose, as a matter
of policy, to disregard reputations.
Local and Global Trust Based on the Concept of Promises 15
A
B
C
D
Fig. 3 A more reliable approach of passing on the trust node a holds on to nodes b, c and d.
7 Reputation
We have defined a reputation to be simply a valuation of something (not necessarily a
promise) received by an agent about some other agent. A natural basis for reputation (and
one that is used on ‘reputation systems’ in computing) is the valuation of trustworthiness.
Here we consider the effect that such transmission of information has on the local trust
within a network of agents.
7.1 Borrowed trust
Suppose that and agent T trusts an agent S to keep its promise to R with probability
ET
(
S
pi:b
−→ R
)
, and suppose that this agent T promises to transmit this as S’s reputation
to another agent U . U ’s estimate of the trustworthiness of T ’s communication is
U
τ :reputation
−→ T
P
≡ EU
(
T
pi:reputation
−→ U
)
(52)
Can we say what U ’s expectation for the reliability of the original promise a pi:b−→ c should
be? In spite of the fact that probabilities for independent events combine by multiplication,
it would be presumptuous to claim that
EU
(
S
pi:b
−→ R
)
= EU
(
T
pi:reputation
−→ U
)
ET
(
S
pi:b
−→ R
)
, (53)
since U does not have any direct knowledge of ET
(
S
pi:b
−→ R
)
, he must evaluate the trust-
worthiness and reliability of the source.
Suppose we denote the communicated value of ET
(
S
pi:b
−→ R
)
by EU←T
(
S
pi:b
−→ R
)
,
then one could conceivably (and as a matter of rational policy) choose to define
EU
(
S
pi:b
−→ R
)
P
≡ EU
(
T
pi:reputation
−→ U
)
EU←T
(
S
pi:b
−→ R
)
. (54)
With this notation, we can conceivably follow historical paths through a network of promises.
However, it is important to see that no agent is obliged to make such a policy. Thus
trust and reputation do not propagate in a faithfully recursive manner. There is, moreover,
in the absence of complete and accurate common knowledge by all agents, an impossibility
of eliminating the unknowns in defining the expectation values.
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7.2 Promised trust
Trust is an evaluation that is private to an agent. This evaluation can be passed on in the
form of a communication (leading to reputation), or it can be passed on as a promise to
trust.
– S promises R that S will trust R: S pi:τ=0.6−→ R.
– S promises R that S will trust T : S pi:τ=0.6−→ R[T ].
Why would anyone promise a party (R) to trust T without telling R? One reason is that
there might be strategic bargaining advantages to doing this[20].
7.3 Updating trust with reputation
An agent can use the reputation of another agent as a sample of evidence by which to judge
its trustworthiness. It can then attach a certain weight to this information according to its
belief, in order to update its own trust. The weighted addition modifies the old trust value
T with the new reputation data R.
E 7→
wnewR+ woldT
wnew + wold
(55)
This is indistinguishable from a Bayesian update.
8 Global Measures of Trust
Which are the most trusted agents in a network? Trust has so far been measured at the
location of each individual agent. The valuation is private. A trust valuation becomes an
agent’s reputation when the valuation is passed on to others. The passing-on includes a
revisional belief process too; this is also a Bayesian posterior probability update process,
just like the case of basing trust on different ensembles in section A.1.
Let us postulate the existence of a vector of received trusts that is available to any
particular agent. The agent is then able to combine this information to work out a global
measure, which we can call community trust. This is analogous to the graphical security
model in [21].
The trust matrix T is defined as follows. The (A,B)-th element of the matrix
TAB(b) ≡ EA(B
pi:b
−→ ∗) (56)
is A’s trust in B with respect to all promises of type b.
Definition 7 (Community trust (Trustworthiness and trustingness)) The global or com-
munity trust is defined by the principal eigenvectors of T and TT. Since this is a transmitted
quantity by definition it is a reputation.
The global reputations for being trustworthy W are defined by the normalized compo-
nents of the principal eigenvector of the transpose matrix:
TBAWB = λWA. (57)
The global reputations for being most trusting S are defined by the normalized compo-
nents of the principal eigenvector
TABSB = λSA. (58)
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An agent is said to be trusting if it assigns a high probability of keeping its promises to
those agents that it trusts. An agent is said to be trustworthy if other agents assign it a high
probability of keeping promises to it.
Observe that, in the absence of labels about specific agent relationships, the concepts of
trustworthiness and trustingness for an agent A are properties of the global trust graph that
has A as a source, and not of an individual agent, since they are derived from relationships
and by voting.
We can easily show that this has the property of a proportional vote. Let vi denote a
vector for the trust ranking, or connectedness of the trust graph, of each node i. Then, the
trustworthiness of node i is proportional to the sum of the votes from all of i’s nearest
neighbours, weighted according to their trustworthiness (i.e. it is just the sum of their trust
valuations):
vi ∝
∑
j=neighbours of i
vj . (59)
This may be more compactly written as
vi = (const)×
∑
j
Tijvj , (60)
where T is the trust graph adjacency matrix, whose entries Tij are 1 if i is a neighbour of
j, and 0 otherwise. We can rewrite eqn. (60) as
T v = λv . (61)
Now one sees that the vector is actually an eigenvector of the trust matrix T . If T is an
N ×N matrix, it has N eigenvectors (one for each node in the network), and correspond-
ingly many eigenvalues. The eigenvalue of interest is the principal eigenvector, i.e. that
with highest eigenvalue, since this is the only one that results from summing all of the pos-
sible pathways with a positive sign. The components of the principal eigenvector rank how
self-consistently ‘central’ a node is in the graph. Note that only ratios vi/vj of the com-
ponents are meaningfully determined. This is because the lengths |v| =
√∑
i vivi of the
eigenvectors are not determined by the eigenvector equation. We normalize them here by
setting the highest component to 1. This form of well-connectedness is termed ’eigenvec-
tor centrality’ [22] in the field of social network analysis, where several other definitions of
centrality exist.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Fig. 4 An example trust graph. For simplicity all trust arrows are assumed of the same type, e.g. trust
in the promise to pay bills. Dashed lines are lines which will be removed in the second example.
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Note this does not assume any transitivity of trust, it says simply: each agent’s trust
worthiness is equal the sum of all the other agents’ trust measures (as if they are voting),
weighted so that the most trustworthy agents’ opinions are weighted proportionally highest.
It is a proportional representation vote by the agents about one another.
8.1 Example of global trust
Consider a number of promises of a single type, e.g. agents promise to pay their bills in
various service interactions. Each payee then rates its expectation of the payer and makes
this information globally available as a public measure of its local trust. Referring to fig. 4,
we assume the following local trusts:
1
τ :pay
−→ 6 = 0.2 (62)
2
τ :pay
−→ 6 = 0.3
3
τ :pay
−→ 7 = 0.1
4
τ :pay
−→ 7 = 0.1
5
τ :pay
−→ 7 = 0.1
6
τ :pay
−→ 7 = 0.6
7
τ :pay
−→ 6 = 0.5
6
τ :pay
−→ 8 = 0.8
8
τ :pay
−→ 6 = 0.2
7
τ :pay
−→ 8 = 0.8
8
τ :pay
−→ 7 = 0.3
The trust matrix is thus
T =


0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.8
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0


(63)
Note that the bars delineate the dashed lines which will be removed in the second exam-
ple. The normalized right eigenvector S8 represents how trusting the agents are. The left
eigenvectorW8 (or the eigenvector of the transpose matrix) represents the global trustwor-
thiness:
S8 =


0.21
0.31
0.10
0.10
0.10
1.00
0.94
0.50


, W8 =


0
0
0
0
0
0.55
0.65
1.00


(64)
Thus, agent 8 is the most trustworthy. Agents 1 to 5 are not trustworthy at all in this sce-
nario, since we have not rated any promises made by them. Agent 6 is the most trusting
of all, since it gives a large amount of trust to agent 8. Thus, these two agents colour the
global picture of trust significantly through their behaviours.
Local and Global Trust Based on the Concept of Promises 19
We note that the agents with zero trust ratings are all recipients of promises; they do not
make any promises of their own. These are suppliers of whatever service or good is being
sold; they do not promise payments to anyone, hence no one needs to trust them to pay
their bills. The reader might find this artificial: these agents might make it their policy to
trust the agents even though they have made no promise. In this case, we must ask whether
the trust would be of the same type or not: i.e. would the buyers trust the suppliers to pay
their bills, or would their trust be based on a different promise, e.g. the promise to provide
quality goods.
By contrast, the agents who are not trusted are somewhat trusting by virtue of receiving
such promises of payment.
Suppose we eliminate agent number 8 (by removing the dashed lines in the figure), let
us see how the ranking changes when we delete this important agent. Now agent 6 still
remains the most trusting, but agent 7 becomes the most trusted, once again mainly due to
agent 6’s contribution.
S7 =


0.37
0.55
0.17
0.17
0.17
1.00
0.92


, W7 =


0
0
0
0
0
0.91
1.00


(65)
We can note that the symmetries of the graph are represented in the eigenvector in a natural
way.
8.2 Boundaries and allegiances
Canright and Monsen have defined regions of a graph, based on the structures that arise nat-
urally from eigenvector centrality[23]. This has been further developed for directed graphs
in ref. [24]. Trust is sometimes associated with maintaining certain boundaries or alle-
giances. The global trust model proposed above falls into a natural landscape based on the
graph, that is characterized by local maxima. Agents cluster naturally into distinct hills of
mutual trust, separated by valleys of more tenuous trust, in the centrality function.
This characterization is a useful way of identifying a community structure. Humans
are not very good at understanding boundaries: they understand identities. e.g. a company
name, but where is the real boundary of the company or computer system? Its tendrils
of influence might be farther or closer than one imagines. The topology of underlying
promises offers a quantifiable answer to this question. Such allegiances can be compared
to the notion of a coalition in game theory[25,26].
9 Trust architectures
Trust is closely associated with information dissemination. There are essentially only two
distinct models for achieving information distribution: centralization and ad hoc epidemic
flooding. Alternatively one might call them, central-server versus peer-to-peer.
Two so-called trust models are used in contemporary technologies today, reflecting
these approaches: the Trusted Third Party model (e.g. X.509 certificates, TLS, or Kerberos)
and the Web of Trust (as made famous by the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) system due to Phil
Zimmerman and its subsequent clones). Let us consider how these models are represented
in terms of our promise model.
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9.1 Trusted Third Parties
The centralized solution to “trust management” is the certificate authority model, intro-
duced as part of the X.509 standard and modified for a variety of other systems (See fig.
5)[27,28,29]. In this model, a central authority has the final word on identity confirmation
and often acts as a broker between parties, verifying identities for both sides.
The authority promises (often implicitly) to all agents the legitimacy of each agent’s
identity (hopefully implying that it verifies this somehow). Moreover, for each consulta-
tion the authority promises that it will truthfully verify an identity credential (public key)
that is presented to it. The clients and users of this service promise that they will use this
confirmation. Thus, in the basic interaction, the promises being made here are:
Authority
pi:Legitimate
−→ User (66)
Authority
pi:Verification
−→ User (67)
User
pi:U(Verification)
−→ Authority (68)
To make sense of trust, we look for expectations of the promises being kept.
1. The users expect that the authority is legitimate, hence they trust its promise of legiti-
macy.
2. The users expect that the authority verifies identity correctly, hence they trust its promise
of verification and therefore use it.
Users do not necessarily have to be registered themselves with the authority in order to use
its services, so it is not strictly necessary for the authority to trust the user. However, in
registering as a client a user also promises its correct identity, and the authority promises
to use this.
User
pi:Identity
−→ Authority (69)
Authority
pi:U(Identity)
−→ User (70)
One can always discuss the evidence by which users would trust the authority (or third
party). Since information is simply brokered by the authority, the only right it has to legit-
imacy is by virtue of a reputation. Thus expectation 1. above is based, in general, on the
rumours that an agent has heard.
CERT AUTH
Users/clients
Fig. 5 The Trusted Third Party, e.g. TLS or Kerberos. A special agent is appointed in the network
as the custodian of identity. All other agents are expected to trust this. The special agent promises to
verify the authenticity of an object that is shared by the agents. In return for this service, the agents
pay the special agent.
Most of the trust is from users to the authority, thus there is a clear subordination of
agents in this model. This is the nature or centralization.
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9.2 Web of Trust
Scepticism in centralized solutions (distrust perhaps) led to the invention of the epidemic
trust model, known as the Web of Trust (see fig. 6)[30]. In this model, each individual agent
is responsible for its own decisions about trust. Agents confirm their belief in credentials
by signing one another’s credentials. Hence if I trust A and A has signed B’s key then I am
more likely to trust B.
As a management approximation, users are asked to make a judgement about a key
from one of four categories: i) definitely trustworthy, ii) somewhat trustworthy, iii) un-
trustworthy, iv) don’t know.
An agent then compares these received valuations to a threshold value to decide whether
or not a credential is trustworthy to it.
The promises are between the owner of the credential and a random agent:
Owner
pi:Identity
−→ Agent (71)
Agent
pi:U(Identity)
−→ Owner (72)
Agent
pi:Signature
−→ Owner (73)
Owner
pi:U(Signature)
−→ Agent (74)
The owner must first promise its identity to an agent it meets. The agent must promise to
believe and use this identity credential. The agent then promises to support the credential
by signing it, which implies a promise (petition) to all subsequent agents. Finally, the owner
can promise to use the signature or reject it. Trust enters here in the following ways:
1. The agent expects that the identity of the owner is correct and trusts it. This leads to a
Use promise.
2. The Owner expects that the promise of support is legitimate and trusts it. This leads to
a Use promise.
What is interesting about this model is that it is much more symmetrical than the central-
ized scheme. It has certain qualities that remind us of our definition of global trust in section
8. However, it is not equivalent to our model, since the very nature of the web of trust is
dictated by the transactions in the model, which are automatically bilateral (ours need not
be). Moreover, the information is passed on in a peer to peer way, where as our global ide-
alization makes trust valuations common knowledge (global reputations). In some respects,
the web of trust is a pragmatic approximation to the idealized notion of trust in section 8.
The main differences are:
– In the Web of trust, a limited number of expectation values is allowed and the user does
not control these, i.e. there are few policy choices for agent expectation allowed.
– An agent does not see a complete trust or promise graph. It sees only the local cluster
to which it is connected. This is sufficient to compute a global trust for that component
of the graph.
– The Web of Trust graph is always bilateral, with arrows moving in both directions, thus
no one is untrusted, or un-trusting.
– The information to construct a fully self-consistent measure of trust is not available in
the system. Hence there is no clear measure of who is more trustworthy in the web of
trust.
Some of these limitations could no doubt be removed. A Bayesian approach could
naturally lead to a better approximation. However, a basic flaw in these implementation
mechanisms is the need to trust of the mediating software itself. Since, as we have shown,
trust is not necessarily transitive, one ends up in most cases trusting the software that is
supposed to implement the trust management rather than the parties themselves.
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sign sign
Fig. 6 In a web of trust an agent signals a promise to all other agents that it has trusted the authen-
ticity of the originator’s identity. As a key is passed around (second figure) agents can promise its
authenticity by signing it or not.
10 Conclusions
The concept of promises provides a foundation that has been unclear in discussions of trust.
It allows us to decouple the probabilistic aspect from the network aspect of policy relation-
ships, without introducing instantaneous events. It provides (we claim) a natural language
for specific policies, extended over time. Promises have types and denote information flow
which in turn allows us to discuss what is trusted and by whom. We believe the use of
promises to be superor to a definition based on actions, since the localization of actions as
space-time events makes trust ill-defined if the action has either not yet been executed or
after it has been executed.
Promises allow us to relate trust and trust-reputation in a generic way, and suggest an
algorithm from which to derive global network properties, based on social network theory.
This is a significant improvement over previous models. Reputation is not uniquely coupled
to trust, of course – it can be related to many different valuations of promised behaviour,
including wealth, kindness etc.
We show how bundles of promises can be combined using the rules for probabilistic
events (similar to fault tree analysis) and we model the two main trust architectures easily.
The PGP Web of Trust as well as the Trusted Third Party can be explained as a special case
the global trust models derived here; however standard tools do not permit users to see the
entire web, or measure relative trust-worthiness in a community using these implementa-
tions.
In future work there is the possibility to use this notion of trust in explicit systems.
The Unix configuration system cfengine[31] uses the notion of promises and agent auton-
omy to implement a policy based management system. The trustworthiness of hosts with
respect to certain different behaviours can be measured directly by neighbouring agents to
whom promises are made. More generally, if one has a monitoring system that one believes
trustworthy to begin with, it is possible to observe whether an agent stops keeping its own
promises about security issues. This might be a signal to reevaluate one’s expectation that
the system is trustworthy. These tests have been partially imeplemented in cfengine and are
presently being tested.
Trust is merely an expression of policy and it is therefore fundamentally ad hoc. Promises
reveal the underlying motives for trust and whether they are rationally or irrationally formed.
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A Expectation
Here we expand on our notion of an expectation function for completeness. These details
are not essential to the arguments in the rest of the paper.
An expectation function is a statistical concept that relies either on a body of evidence,
or alternatively on a belief informed by limited observation. Such evidences or beliefs are
summarized by a probability distribution over the different possible outcomes. We shall
consider mainly the outcomes “promise kept” and “promise not kept”, though varying de-
grees are possible.
The notion of an expectation value is well known from the theory of probability and
can be based on either classical frequentist-probability or Bayesian belief-probability[32].
There is, for this reason, no unique expectation operator.
Why dabble in intangibles such as beliefs? Computer systems are frequently asked to
trust one another without ever having met (for example when they automatically download
patches and updates from their operating system provider, virus update from third-parties
or even accept the word of trusted third parties in identification) – thus they have little or no
empirical evidence to go on. Each time they interact however, they are able to revise their
initial estimates on the basis of experience. In this regard, a Bayesian view of probability
is a natural interpretation, see e.g. [33]. This is a subjective view of probability that works
well with our subjective agents.
Definition 8 (Expectation function E(X)) Given random variablesX,Y , an expectation
operator or function has the properties:
1. If X ≥ 0, E(X) ≥ 0.
2. If a, b ∈ R, then E(aX + bY ) = aE(X) + bE(Y ).
3. E(1) = 1.
For a probability distribution over discrete classes c = 1 . . . C, it is the convex sum
E(X) =
C∑
c=1
pcXx
∣∣∣ C∑
c=1
pc = 1. (75)
The expectation value of a Bernoulli variable (with value 0 or 1) is clearly just equal to the
probability of obtaining 1 p1 = Pr(X = 1). In general, a promise might lead to more than
one outcome, several of which might be acceptable ways of keeping the promise, however
this possibility only complicates the story for now, hence we choose to consider only the
simplest case of
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Definition 9 (Agent expectation EA(a pi:b−→ c)) The agent expectation EA(X) is defined
to be the agent A’s estimation of the probability that a promise a pi:b−→ c will be kept.
This can be realized in any number of different ways, e.g. as a mapping from an ensemble
of evidence of size N (with the binary outcomes 0 and 1) into the open interval:
EA : {0, 1}
N → [0, 1] (76)
or it could could be an ad hoc value selected from a table of pre-decided values.
A.1 Ensembles and samples of evidence
An ensemble is a collection of experiments that test the value of a random variable. In one
experiment, we might evaluate the agent expectation to be p1. In another, we might evaluate
it to be P1. What then is the probability we should understand from the ensemble of both?
We expect that the appropriate answer is an average of these two values, but what if we
attach more importance to one value than to the other? Probabilities discard an essential
piece of information: the size of the body of evidence on which they are based. Let us
consider this important point for a moment.
A.1.1 Frequentistic interpretation In the frequentist interpretation of probability, all esti-
mates are based on past hard evidence. Probabilities are considered reliable as estimators of
future behaviour if they are based on a sufficiently large body of evidence. Let lower-case
p1 = n1/n, the probability of keeping a promise, be based on a total of n measurements,
of which the frequencies n1 were positive and n0 were negative, with n1 + n0 = n. Also,
let upper-case P1 = N1/N be an analogous set of measurements for which N 6= n. How
should we now combine these two independent trials into a single value for their ensemble?
In the frequentist interpretation of probability, the answer is clear: we simply com-
bine all the original data into one trial and see what this means for the probabilities.
Rationally, the combined probability E for the ensemble must end up having the value
E = (n1+N1)/(n+N). If we express this result in terms of the probabilities, rather than
the frequencies, we have
E =
(
n
n+N
)
p1 +
(
N
n+N
)
P1 =
n1 +N1
n+N
(77)
This leads us to the intuitive conclusion that the probabilities should be combined according
to a weighted average, in which the weights are chosen to attach proportionally greater
importance to the larger trial:
E = α1p1 + α2P1, α1 + α2 = 1. (78)
In general, then, with T trials of different sizes, the result would be a convex combination
of the expectations from each trial:
E =
T∑
i=1
αipi,
T∑
i=1
αi = 1. (79)
In the case that there are more possible outcomes than simply 0 and 1, the same argument
applies for each outcome.
The problem occurs when we do not have complete knowledge of the sample sizes
n,N, . . . etc., for, in this case, we can only guess the relative importances αi, and choose
them as a matter of policy. If, for example, we could choose to make all the αi equally
important, in which case we have no control over the importance of the expectations.
This so-called frequentist interpretation of expectation or probability generally requires
a significant body of evidence in the form of independent events to generate a plausible
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estimate. However, in most ad hoc encounters, we do not have such a body of evidence.
Trust is usually based on just a handful of encounters, and one’s opinion of the current
evidence is biased by prior expectations. Hence, we turn to the alternative interpretation or
Bayesian probability.
A.1.2 Bayesian interpretation The policy formula in eqn. (79) is essentially a Bayesian
belief formula, which can be derived from the classic Bayes interpretation for a posteriori
belief.
Suppose we devise an experimental test e to determine whether a hypothesis H of ex-
pected trustworthiness is true. We repeat this test, or borrow other agent’s observations, thus
collecting n of these e1 . . . en. The result for P (H |en, e), our belief in the trustworthiness-
hypothesis given the available evidence, changes by iteration according to:
P (H |en, e) =
P (H |en)× P (e|en, H)
P (e|en, H)P (H |en) + P (e|en,¬H)P (¬H |en)
(80)
where we feed back one value P (H |en−1, e) from the previous iteration as P (H |en), and
we must revise potentially two estimates on each iteration:
– P (e|en, H) is our estimate that the test e will show positive as a direct result of the
Hypothesis being true, i.e. because the host was trustworthy.
– P (e|en,¬H) is our estimate of how often e is true due to other causes than the hypoth-
esis H of trustworthiness, e.g. due to trickery.
Note that P (¬H |en) = 1−P (H |en). This gives us a definite iterative procedure based on
well-accepted Bayesian belief networks for updating our policy on trust[33]. It can easily
be seen that eqn. (79) has this form, but lacks a methodology for rational policy-making.
The advantage of a Bayesian interpretation of policy then, is that it fits well with the
notion of trust as a policy decision.
A.2 Policy and rationality
What kind of policy should be employed in defining the expectation of future behaviour?
Probability theory is built on the assumption that past evidence can motivate a prediction of
the future. At the heart of this is an assumption that the world is basically constant. How-
ever, future prediction is the essence of gambling: there are scenarios in which evidence of
the past is not an adequate guide to future behaviour. An agent might also look elsewhere
for guidance.
– Initialization: An agent of which we have initially no experience might be assigned an
initial trust value of 1, 12 , or 0 if we are respectively trusting, neutral or un-trusting by
nature.
– Experience: One’s own direct experience of a service or promise has primacy as a basis
for trusting an agent in a network. However, an optimistic agent might choose not to
allow the past to rule the future, believing that agents can change their behaviour, e.g.
“the agent was having a bad day”.
– Advice: An agent might feel that it is not the best judge and seek the advice of a rep-
utable or trustworthy agent. “Let’s see what X thinks”. We shall use this idea in section
8 to define a global trustworthiness.
– Reputation: Someone else’s experience with a promise can serve as an initial value for
our own trust.
– Damnation: Some agents believe that, if an agent fails even once to fulfil a promise,
then it is completely un-trustworthy. This extreme policy seems excessive, since there
might be reasons beyond the control of the agent that prevent it from delivering on its
promise.
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If we lack any evidence at all about the trustworthiness of an agent with respect to a
given promise, we might adopt a policy of using the agent’s record of keeping other kinds
of promises.
Proposal 4 (Transference of evidence) In the absence of direct evidence of type t(b), in a
promise body b, one may use a policy determined mixture of values from other types as an
initial estimate.
The rationality of such a procedure can easily be questioned, but there is no way to rule out
the ad hoc decision as a matter of policy.
